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Behind most arguments about economic matters in the United States 
lie certain assumptions concerning the validity of economic reform, or 
at least the validity of the forms economic reform can take. Failure to 
understand the character and nature of these assumptions, or to com-
prehend their impact upon economic positions and values, makes defini-
tion and relevant discussion of current and past attempts at economic 
reform difficult, if not impossible. At a time in our national existence 
during which pressure for economic reform is endemic, understanding 
of these matters is crucial. This paper examines the bases of two sets of 
these assumptions, and deals specifically with their impact upon attitudes 
toward economic reform. 
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In 1843 Henry David Thoreau reviewed the German economist }. A. 
Etzler's The Paradise within the Reach of All Men, Without Labor, by 
Powers of Nature and Machinery; An Address to All Intelligent Men.1 
Apparently having its analytical base in Fourierism and drawing its 
philosophic impulse from eighteenth-century socialism, Etzler's book 
provided Thoreau with an occasion to propose American Transcendental 
ideals of economic reform as an alternative to those of French Associa-
tionist Socialism. In effect the review stands as an incipient manifesto of 
Thoreau's Transcendental economic thought, receiving its inspiration 
from Emerson's Nature and anticipating its fruition in the "Economy" 
chapter of Walden. It is a document that goes far toward explaining 
why European ideas about economic reform failed to gain wide currency 
in nineteenth-century America.2 And it provides a powerful argument 
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for an individualistic conservative approach to economic reform in the 
United States. 
During the early part of the nineteenth century, particularly during 
the Jacksonian period, two concurrent movements were underway. First, 
the franchise was being extended increasingly to the non-propertied 
classes; second, the way was being opened to an extension of "Liberal 
Capitalism/'3 These two movements reinforced one another. More im-
portantly, they gave rise to a mood of optimism consistent with growth 
of the entrepreneurial spirit and acceptance, on its own terms, of the 
credo of materialism. It is not too much to suggest that the definition of 
productive and non-productive human effort began to resemble that 
offered by Adam Smith more closely than that of any American spokes-
man.4 With this change, the stage was set for concentration upon eco-
nomic expansion and a relative denigration of human effort and thought 
not related to this end. 
This was a period too in which, as a contemporary observer said, "the 
forms of life . . . were, in a measure, plastic," and "the test of truth was 
its availability."5 Not only was the United States too young for any 
serious concern about the future (at least not in any pessimistic sense), 
but it was also young enough to be impatient with fixed traditions. 
Experiments in life were made innocently, without regard to precedent. 
New England orthodox protestantism had metamorphosed into intel-
lectual protestantism. In 1836 Emerson's Nature sanctified idealism as a 
critical method when it identified the self as spiritual authority for 
truth. American Transcendentalist methodology was unique. Having its 
roots in Platonism it was idealistic; but as a philosophical "system," it 
was also markedly individualistic. It was a reaction against formalism 
and tradition, against Puritan orthodoxy. O. B. Frothingham describes 
the distinctiveness of Transcendentalism in the following way: "Prac-
tically it was an assertion of the inalienable worth of man; theoretically 
it was an assertion of the immanence of divinity in instinct, the trans-
ference of supernatural attributes to the natural constitution of man-
kind."6 
The Transcendentalists held that latent in all men is a force capable 
of propelling them toward attainment of their highest ideals. Man and 
society are perfectable if only the myopia of individual man can be 
corrected. The nineteenth-century music critic and Transcendental 
thinker John S. Dwight looked with disgust on the refusal of his con-
temporaries to unleash this force. 
On all hands, men's existence is converted into a prepara-
tion for existence. We do not properly live, in these days; 
but everywhere with patent inventions and complex ar-
rangements are getting ready to live. The end is lost in the 
means, life is smothered in appliances. . . . Goodness is 
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exhausted in aids to goodness, and all the vigor and health 
of the soul is expended in quack contrivances to build it 
up.7 
For the Transcendentalist, reform was the primary duty of the 
individual; and this reform meant self-culture, culture of the heart, of 
conscience, of sympathy and of spirituality as essential components of 
a meaningful and progressive existence. Having as an article of faith 
man's capacity for infinite improvement, the Transcendentalist could 
never be happy with the man whom Emerson looked on as a "God in 
ruins" and whom Thoreau saw as inhabiting airy castles without founda-
tions. The serious Transcendentalists discovered that idealism without 
moral hypostasis was unlikely to be fruitful. 
Necessarily, then, the Transcendentalist gave precedence to regenera-
tion of the human spirit over reform of human circumstance. It was 
impossible for a Transcendentalist to associate himself with any move-
ment or cause that did not start from the assumption of the human 
requirement for personal dignity. He could oppose slavery (as most 
Transcendentalists did) because he was aware of the slave as a human 
being whose capacity for development was stifled. Or he could support 
mass education for children because this was a prerequisite to develop-
ment of the self by the child. But wider social reform, particularly that 
in the economic sphere, was viewed with distrust because it implied a 
conscious act on the part of society to develop society in the abstract 
rather than to encourage organic development of the individual. No 
system that denied the self-determination of man within his given 
circumstances could be accepted. Only those acts by society that clearly 
could be shown to unlock possibilities for self-determination by in-
dividuals (possibilities they could not unlock for themselves) were ac-
ceptable; and artificial or imposed organization and class identification 
were viewed with suspicion.8 
ii 
In contrast to this Transcendental suspicion of abstract economics, 
European reformers led by Fourier and his followers proceeded from 
the premise that economic reform could be legislated upon the basis 
of social and philosophical truths. 
Fourier was a member of the Associationist branch of European so-
cialism, and his philosophic underpinning was that of eighteenth-century 
socialism.9 This body of thought started with the search for the source 
of evil in society and in man. It defined selfishness as the origin of evil, 
and the cause of selfishness was presumed to be self-interest. In turn, 
self-interest was held to be rooted in private property. For these socialists 
it followed, therefore, that elimination of private property (or, at least, 
placing social restraint upon its use) would eliminate the cause of evil 
and promote economic and social equality. 
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French socialists, typically, stopped short of advocating complete 
elimination of privacy in property. Instead they proposed that private 
property be circumscribed in its use so as to make it completely sub-
servient to the social good.10 As spokesman for this group Fourier was 
mainly concerned with two problems. First, he wished to coordinate 
economic functions with each other and with social functions so as to 
eliminate impediments to maximum economic and social gain. Second, 
he wanted to eliminate forms of social and economic organization which 
allowed some individuals to over-consume while denying sufficient con-
sumption to others.11 
Reforming the uses of private property, and particularly the rules of 
property administration, Fourierists thought, would sufficiently purify 
private property by eliminating the possibility of its manipulation for 
selfish ends.12 This would make it unnecessary to do away with the 
institution of private property itself; the change in its character would 
be sufficient. But the Fourierists were consistent with the main body of 
socialist thought in their acceptance of the notion that privacy in 
property is a social institution, created by society and susceptible to 
destruction by society.13 
Fourier's program for progress was three-fold: first, action by society 
to eliminate evil; second, conscious reform directed at changing the 
environment within which economic and social activity occurs; and 
finally, generation of change in man himself. In particular, Fourier be-
lieved there was a natural force that pulled men together for collective 
action. Man had become anti-social, he argued, because artificial ob-
stacles had been put in the way of the operation of this force. His 
proposals for reform centered upon elimination of these obstacles, 
thereby making it possible for men to cooperate fully with their fellows 
under the influence of their natural dominant passion, brotherly love.14 
Since existing institutions were perceived to be obstructive to the 
play of this passion (and of its corollary passions), Fourier proposed 
establishment of a new form of economic and social arrangement. He 
envisioned a system in which people would work and live together, thus 
developing a social system that would promote both a sense of harmony 
among the component parts of society and a more efficient production 
and distribution system. He envisioned development of production cen-
ters (phalanxes) and consumption centers (phalasteries).15 The purpose 
of each was integral to its form. The production centers were viewed as 
a means of integrating economic activity. The consumption centers were 
viewed as a means of integrating social and economic affairs. These 
organizational forms were defended on two bases: first, Fourier thought 
that integration of economic activities would give rise to substantial 
efficiencies in production;16 second, he hoped that development of the 
consumption centers would negate economic differences among indi-
viduals and remove this artificial barrier to social harmony. 
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The organizational structure of the phalanxes and the method of 
determining income shares were designed to facilitate attainment of 
social harmony. Everything consumed by members of a phalanx was 
expected to be produced by the phalanx; and in turn, the members 
were expected to consume everything produced. But this was of rela-
tively minor importance. One can conceive of integrated economic and 
social activity without self-sufficiency. The income distribution aspect 
was more important. The phalanx was to be organized as a joint-stock 
company, with shares to be paid on the basis of individual holdings 
(stockholders were to receive four-twelfths of net receipts, workers five-
twelfths and managers three-twelfths). It was hoped that these shares, 
as well as the notion of sharing, would eliminate economic distinctions 
among men, while the association of these same individuals in the 
phalasterie would eliminate social distinctions. The result would be a 
greater sense of equality of man. 
Fourier and his followers believed, then, that mankind could be 
improved by changes in its economic and social circumstances. Of 
greater importance, perhaps, they believed that these changes in eco-
nomic and social circumstance could best be generated through con-
scious, rational human effort directed at change in the economic and 
social forms of organization.17 Etzler's contribution to the Fourierist 
literature lay in his stress upon the potential of technology, applied in 
harmony with nature, to expand the efficiency of economic activity and 
to hasten attainment of the paradise in which problems of production 
and distribution have been solved. The method of financing and organi-
zation proposed by Etzler adhered closely to that outlined by Fourier. 
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It is important to remember that the national mood in the United 
States at the time Thoreau wrote his review of Etzler's book reflected 
the attitudes of the materialists. The economy was growing rapidly, 
society was becoming increasingly urbanized in the New England area 
and expedient methods of attaining a progress unfettered by moral, 
cultural and religious institutions were being sought. These methods 
raised questions noted almost exclusively by Transcendentalists. They 
asked, what is the meaning of material betterment without concern for 
moral integrity? And what is the relevance of active reform without 
faith? Yet Thoreau recognized the need for reformers. He wrote: 
We can afford to lend a willing ear occasionally to those 
earnest reformers of the age. Let us treat them hospitably. 
Shall we be charitable only to the poor? What though they 
be fanatics? Their errors are likely to be generous errors, 
and these may be they who will put to rest the American 
Church and the American government, and awaken better 
ones in their stead.18 
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In one sense Thoreau used Etzler's book as a vehicle to raise the 
questions. In another sense, to Thoreau Etzler was a reformer who 
deserved to be dealt with as a serious thinker. 
Thoreau saw in Etzler's plan what he considered to be the dilemma 
of a scientific society unpossessed of spiritual guidance. As a Trans-
cendentalist Thoreau agreed that man should be concerned with this 
world and should attempt its improvement. The greater portion of the 
essay serves to prove the point that Etzler's calculations should not be 
disparaged: "They are truths in physics, because they are true in 
ethics."19 But the first step, he thought, should involve a soul-searching 
reformation of man himself, by man himself. Thus, before he wrote the 
review, he recorded in his journal, "The times have no heart. The true 
reform can be undertaken any morning before unbarring the door. It 
calls for no convention. I can do two-thirds the reform of the world 
myself."20 
Thoreau was a moral realist who began with the Transcendental 
proposition that man possessed an inward capability of attaining a more 
satisfactory existence through the search of his own soul. He believed 
this inner achievement—man's recognition of his spiritual capacity—to 
be both more important than improvement in material well-being and 
more necessary if material well-being is to be meaningful in human 
terms. His own proposal for material reform was first to redeem the 
"New England soil of the world," the human soul.21 
The essence of Thoreau's critique of Etzler's Utopia was that Etzler 
put the cart before the horse. Etzler wished to harness nature to man's 
work before man had succeeded in harnessing himself. In Thoreau's 
mind Etzler had not come to grips satisfactorily with two crucial issues. 
First, what is the purpose of progress?22 Second, what will be the impact 
upon nature if man views it solely as something to be used by man to 
further his own ends? 
Taking the second question first, Thoreau states, "It must be con-
fessed that horses at present work too exclusively for man, rarely men 
for horses; and the brute degenerates in man's company."23 Man should 
not deal grossly with nature. In an attempt to gain more from use of 
natural resources, man frequently destroys the function of nature. Thus 
the purpose of progress seems futile indeed when it frequently means an 
end to the potential for future progress. Thoreau engaged upon an 
attack of that which the Transcendentalist feared most—an overwhelm-
ing, warped sense of man's superiority over the things of nature and 
progress denned in terms of transitory gain. 
His attitude toward materialistic reform is reflected most definitely 
in his reaction to a single idea expressed by Etzler: " 'Any member may 
procure himself all the common articles of his daily wants, by a short 
turn of some crank. . . .' "24 Thoreau answers that the crank that must 
be turned to begin any action is "the crank within," a tool "but sparingly 
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employed as yet."25 Here Thoreau attacks the materialist head on. The 
thing that is needed for reform, and the thing that is within the reach 
of all men, is faith or "divine energy." This is the "crank" available to 
individuals possessing meaningful values. Mankind is too unpracticed 
to permit the kind of dependence upon others required for success of 
the Fourierist plan.26 As Thoreau put it, "We are older by faith than by 
experience."27 And thus man should rely upon himself, knowing that 
society is so undeveloped that reliance upon others is useless, if not 
dangerous. One must suspect that even if this were not so Thoreau must 
object. When Etzler said, "It will now be plainly seen that the execu-
tion of the proposals is not proper for individuals. . . . Man is powerful 
but in union with many," Thoreau despaired by saying, "Alas! This is 
the crying sin of the age, this want of faith in the prevalence of a man. 
Nothing can be affected but by one man. . . . We must first succeed 
alone. . . . In this matter of reforming the world, we have little faith in 
corporations; not thus was it first formed."28 
But whether man goes it alone or bands together with others, the 
major problem remains. Is progress to be defined merely as change in 
the level of material output? Thoreau suggests that progress as spoken 
of by Etzler "aims to secure the greatest degree of gross comfort and 
pleasure merely. . . . It paints a Mahometan's heaven, and stops short 
with singular abruptness when we think it is drawing near the precincts 
of the Christian's."29 Progress so defined leads to a society without love, 
without moral influence; a kind of society that has historically "patented 
only such machines as the almshouse, the hospital, and the Bible 
society."30 
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As an explication of a theory of reform Thoreau's review is neces-
sarily tentative. It is also written in the idiom of the protestant idealist 
who warily eyes the human motives and potential efficacy of a conscience-
less corporation. But closely read, these remarks approach a viable 
resolution to the materialist-idealist debate in reform. As an idealist 
who found analogues to his truths in nature, Thoreau looked in vain 
for the reverse process in Etzler's book: "His castles in the air fall to 
the ground, because they are not built lofty enough; they should be 
secured to heaven's roof."31 Thoreau thought that Etzler failed to see 
what he (Thoreau) saw only too clearly: 
Undoubtedly if we were to reform this outward life truly 
and thoroughly, we should find no duty of the inner omitted. 
It would be employed for our whole nature; and what we 
should do thereafter would be as vain a question as to ask 
the bird what it will do when its nest is built and its brood 
reared. But a moral reform must take place first, and then 
the necessity of the other will be superseded, and we shall 
sail and plough by its force alone.32 
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But, for Etzler, this "inner reform" was possible only after facilitating 
social institutions had been developed; and among these institutions 
were those facilitating development and exercise of "natural passions." 
And these institutions required for their enactment the sweeping away 
of contemporary production and distribution forms. Etzler did not 
make this explicit. Had Etzler's physical truths been conceived inten-
tionally as ethical truths, Thoreau might have been satisfied with a 
discussion he found to be challenging to his faith. Instead, he could 
only bemoan the fact that Etzler's means to the end—"the successful 
application of the powers by machinery"—omitted "the application of 
man to the work by faith"; this last he considered to be an "infinitely 
harder" difficulty to overcome.83 Ironically, Etzler dealt with this in 
the Second Part of The Mechanical System. Etzler was, to Thoreau, one 
more materialistic reformer who had been unable to make the analogy 
between the axioms of physics and the laws of ethics any more than a 
figure of speech. 
Thoreau saw Etzler's proposals leading to creation of a mechanistic, 
structured society that imprisons its creators. He felt that freedom— 
defined as a wide range of commitment—would be unavailable within 
the framework of such a society. He saw the goals of that society as 
being ineluctably self-defined by the system in terms insuring its own 
perpetuation. And he saw that pursuit of those goals gives rise to mind-
less expansion of goods that lack real utility; to development of methods 
of control for the sake of control; to application of scientific knowledge 
without regard for its use. He saw a society created without concern for 
coherence of goals, and suffering, in consequence, the penalties of pursuit 
of specific goals single-mindedly. He saw, therefore, a materialistic so-
ciety caught ironically in its historic economic definition of progress. 
Such was the result of man's imposition upon himself of a moral code 
which merely expedited the aims of a society with quantitative material 
gain. This moral code stemmed from application of man's intellect 
applied uniquely to economic and social problems: it denied the 
analogue of the material and the spiritual. Paradoxically, it led, Tho-
reau feared, to love of self rather than to the love of others that would 
make possible lasting reform. Ironically, Fourier's complaint against 
existing arrangements for production and distribution had been precisely 
that they impeded men in exercise of their dominant passion, brotherly 
love. And Etzler, as a Fourierist, had to be convinced that as soon as 
scope for man's natural goodness had been provided moral man would 
rise spontaneously. 
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